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THE WORLD OF LAW, SCIENCE,
AND MEDICINE ACCORDING TO
GEORGE P. SMITH, II
Raymond C. O'Brien*
I.
When one enters George Smith's law school office, closes the door, and
hunts for a vacant area to sit, one is confronted with two posters taped to the
back of his door: one of the remote and isolated village of Bellagio, Italy, on
Lake Como, where he visited as a Rockefeller Foundation Scholar in De-
cember 1980, and the other from the Cousteau Society that admonishes all
who read it to "Help Make Waves" (and save the whales). It struck me
rather vividly that these two posters capture the spirit and essence of what
George is all about as a professional: in one sense a remote and objective
scholar; and, in another, a scholar who writes about "cutting edge" subjects
and does in fact "make waves!"
The entry for George P. Smith, II, in Marquis' Who's Who in the World
numbers fifty-one lines' and that entry shapes the contours of his profes-
sional life of service. It does not, however, list the bibliography of his pub-
lished works2 that, in turn, mark the boundaries of his life as a scholar. His
peregrinations as an international lecturer 3-also not listed in his entry-
* Associate Professor of Law, the Catholic University of America; Visiting Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. MARQUIS, WHO'S WHO IN THE WORLD 1013-14 (10th ed. 1991-92).
2. For a bibliographic tribute and complete listing of his writings on his 25th anniversary
of teaching law which is already outdated, see The Complete Bibliography of the Writings of
George P. Smith, II: 1964-1989, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 483 (1990). Each of
these entries and papers documenting his scholarly presentations are in his archive at the Lilly
Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
3. Quiet Desperation or Heightened Living: The Plight of The Elderly, U. of Victoria,
B.C. (Feb. 1992); Health Care Delivery for the Elderly, U. of Auckland, N.Z. (July 1991);
Human Experimentation or Human Advancement?, Monash U., Melbourne, Austl. (Aug.
1990); Stop, in the Name of Love!, The International Meeting of the American Society of Law
and Medicine, London, Eng. (July 1989); Murder, She Wrote or Was It Merely Selective Non-
Treatment?, Hughes Hall, Cambridge U., Eng. (May 1989); Tender is the Night and Gentle
the Dawn, The Centenary Congress of the Australian and N.Zea. Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science, Sydney, Austl. (May 1988); Opportunities for the New Biology: Per-
plexities in the Yin and the Yang, The National U. of Singapore, Sing. (July 1987); The
Province and Function of Law, Science and Medicine: Leeways of Choice, Patterns of Dis-
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add a lustre to his perspective as both teacher and scholar. Similarly, his
various research appointments nationally and internationally4 have under-
course, The Julius Stone Memorial Lecture, U. of New South Wales, Sydney, Austl. (Aug.
1987); Partings and Sweet Sorrows, The American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Ill. (May 1987);
Legal Aspects of Selective Non-Treatment of Patients, U. of Texas Medical School, Houston,
Tex. (Jan. 1987); Self Determination v. Rational Suicide, The International Meeting of the
American Society of Law and Medicine, Sydney, Austl. (Aug. 1986); Beginnings and Endings
in Life: Medical and Legal Conundrums, The U. of Texas Medical School, Houston, Tex.
(Mar. 1986); Medical, Legal and Religious Challenges to the New Biology: The Quandary of
In Vitro Fertilization or, Procreational Autonomy: Possessory Interest or Vested Right?, The
Thomas J. White Lecture, Notre Dame U. Law School, South Bend, Ind. (Feb. 1986); Death
Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas, The Rosemary Donley Lecture, Catho-
lic U. of America, School of Nursing, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 1986); Lost Horizons, Captains
Courageous and Handicapped Newborns: Raging Against the Dying Light, Seventh World
Congress on Medical Law, U. of Ghent, Belg. (Aug. 1985); To Be or Not To Be: Self-Deliver-
ance v. Parens Patriae, Indiana U., Institute of Advanced Study, Bloomington, Ind. (July
1985); Sexual Autonomy or Government Intervention: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate
Mothers, World Congress on Law and Medicine, New Delhi, India (Feb. 1985); The Extent of
Government Intervention with Handicapped At Risk Newborns, U. of Texas Medical School,
Houston, Tex. (Feb. 1985); Religion, Law and Conscience in a Brave New World, Serra Inter-
national Foundation, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 1985); Parens Patriae, Familial Autonomy and
Orwellian Spectres: Look Back in Anger?, Twentieth Biennial Meeting of the International
Bar Association, Vienna, Aus. (Sep. 1984); 1984: A Brave or a Confused New World?, The
1984 Fulbright Lectures, Sydney, Austl. (March-Aug. 1984); Strangled Cries in the Mater-
nity Ward: The Plight of the Handicapped Newborn and the Orwellian Spectre of Big
Brother, The Medico-Legal Soc'y of New South Wales, Sydney, Austl. (July 1984); Quality of
Life v. Sanctity of Creation, Cambridge U. Medical School, Cambridge, Eng. (Feb. 1984);
Beyond the Land of Oz: Clones, Cyborgs and Chimeras, Sixth World Congress on Medical
Law, Ghent, Belg. (Aug. 1982); Cryonics and the Law, Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio, Italy
(Dec. 1980); Medicine, Law and Morality: The Szaszian Imperative, The Institute for Human-
istic Studies, State U. of New York at Albany, Albany, N.Y. (Apr. 1980); Cryo-banking and
the Law: Perspectives in Family Planning, American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, Houston, Tex. (Jan. 1979); Law, Science and Medicine: The Challenges of the 21st Cen-
tury, Judge Advocate General's School, Quantico, Va. (July 1979).
4. Including Indiana University's School of Public and Environmental Affairs (Aug.
1992); Center for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford University Eng. (July 1992);
Kings's College Center for Medical Law and Ethics, London, Eng. (July 1992); Wolfson Col-
lege, Cambridge University, Cambridge, Eng. (Easter Term 1992); Trinity College, Dublin
University, Dublin, Ir. (Apr. 1992); University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, Victoria, B.C.
(Feb. 1992); Working Center for Studies in German and International Medical Malpractice
Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Ger. (Jan. 1992); Center for Biomedical Ethics, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Medical School, Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 1991); University of Sydney Law
Faculty, Sydney, Austl. (Aug. 1991); University of Auckland Law Faculty, Auckland, N.Z.
(July 1991); Cleveland Clinic Center for Creative Thinking in Medicine, Cleveland State Uni-
versity, Cleveland, Ohio (June 1991); Yale University Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.
(Apr.-May 1991); Center for the Advanced Study of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washing-
ton, D.C. (1990-91); Center for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Melbourne, Austl.
(July-Aug. 1990); Center for Biomedical Ethics, University of Virginia School of Medicine,
Charlottesville, Va. (Jan. 1990); Hughes Hall, Cambridge University, Cambridge, Eng. (Apr.-
Aug. 1989); Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome, Italy (July 1989); McGill University
Center for Medicine, Ethics and Law, Montreal, Can. (July 1988); Center for Law and Tech-
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scored his commitment to a dynamic research agenda in a variety of forums.
This commitment to research is one that he shares freely with his junior
colleagues as he endeavors to excite and encourage them to develop their
own research programs. This encouragement spawns my present attempt to
author this retrospective.
On a given day, George P. Smith strives to write three thousand words in
final form. On an outstanding day (i.e., cloudy, overcast, or rainy), he has
been known to write as many as eight thousand words. On bad days, he is
fond of relating how he might spend the whole day checking the correct
etiology of a given word in The Oxford English Dictionary5 or contemplating
the advisability of using the dash or the comma as a mark of punctuation.
It has been said that behind every great scholar stands at least one million
footnotes.6 If this be true, George Smith has surely met this first test of
enduring scholarship and is moving toward the second plateau.
Perhaps even more remarkable than this achievement is the manner in
which George writes. The initial draft always comes first, in longhand on
the "vanishing" yellow legal tablet. This is then edited and typed on a porta-
ble manual typewriter he has been using since he first obtained it circa 1956
as a gift from his parents for completing a typing class at Wabash High
School in Wabash, Indiana. After editing, he then takes this piece to a word
processor who, more often than not, makes more errors in the draft than in
his original! One day, after bemoaning this cruel state of affairs, I suggested
to George that this third rather frustrating step could be eliminated if only
he would learn to use a word processor himself. I have pleaded with him
repeatedly to make this bold commitment and stop his lamentations, assur-
ing him that his level of productivity would increase four-fold. He always
responds wryly that he has reached his desired maximum level of productiv-
nology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Austl. (Aug. 1990, July-Aug. 1987, Mar.-
Aug. 1984); National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, Sing. (July 1987); American Bar
Foundation, Chicago, Ill. (May 1987, Dec. 1986); Institute of Advanced Study, Indiana Uni-
versity, Bloomington, Ind. (Summer 1985); Rockefeller University, Pocantico Hills, N.Y.
(Dec. 1984); Australian-American Fulbright Foundation Award, University of New South
Wales, Faculty of Law, Sydney, Austl. (Mar.-Aug. 1984); Clare Hall, Cambridge University,
Cambridge, Eng. (June 1987, Dec. 1986, Dec. 1983-Feb. 1984); The Max Planck Institute for
International and Comparative Law, Heidelberg, Ger. (Summer 1983); The Hoover Institu-
tion, Stanford University, Stanford, Cal. (July 1982); The Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex,
Gender, and Reproduction, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. (July 1981); Institute of
Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (1977-81); Institute of Society, Ethics and
the Life Sciences, The Hastings Center, Briarcliff Manor, N.Y. (Mar. 1981).
5. See George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 142, 145 (1986)
(reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY (1984)).
6. Virginia Stein, A Million Footnotes, 34 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 21 (1989).
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ity the "old-fashioned" way and eschews having his life controlled (or even
worse, manipulated) by an electric screen a la 1984!
Professor Smith takes particular pride in the condition of his office and his
"art" of organized floor, desk, and chair clutter-attributing such to his
wish to complement his late mentor's office at the University of Michigan
Law School. There, Professor William W. Bishop, Jr. enjoyed the pre-emi-
nent honor of having one of the most cluttered offices of anyone on the
faculty.' Yet, when called upon to locate a particular letter, manuscript, or
book, Professor Bishop amazed all with his ability to locate the appropriate
one. Professor Smith is equally skilled!
II.
When reduced to the written word, knowledge may be recognized as more
or less scientific in focus, complementary to or integral with an objective
search for truth, valued within the market place of ideas, or useful.9 Put
directly, the world of law, science, and medicine for Professor George Smith
meets, and in some cases exceeds, all of these evaluative standards. He fol-
lows carefully the admonition of Dean Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law
School that "the role of the scholar is to look in dark places and to shed light
on what he or she sees there.' ' 0 Dean Calabresi continues his observation
by stating,
When that light is shed, people of the world can decide whether
the vision is true or distorted and, even if it is true, whether to pay
attention to what they see or to continue to live with their illusions.
Often such illusions (even if dangerous) are well worth preserving
and the scholar whose iconoclasm has been rejected is foolish to
feel that he or she has been rejected or has not performed a worthy
task, nonetheless. It is not, of course, the job of a scholar to distort
what he or she sees or to describe as false, as myth or subterfuge,
what is not. Yet if in all honesty what the scholar sees seems false,
then the scholar must declare it to be false even if that opens him
or her up to the charge of nihilism."
I find Professor Smith's undistorted vision of biomedicine to be both exciting
and, at the same time, challenging: exciting in its fresh, objective analysis
7. See George P. Smith, II, William Warner Bishop, Jr.: Remembering A Gentle Giant,
10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 32, 35 (1989).
8. See Elizabeth S. Bishop, Personal Recollections, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 323 (1988).
9. David Feldman, The Nature of Legal Scholarship, 52 MOD. L. REV. 498, 498 (1989).
10. Guido Calabresi, Correspondence to Paul D. Carringtron, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 23, 23
(1985) [hereinafter Calabresi, Correspondence]. See also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 180 (1982).
11. Calabresi, Correspondence, supra note 10, at 23.
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and challenging in its admixture of law and economics as complementary
elements to the whole decisional framework of health care delivery.
I shall not consider George Smith's books in the field of law, science and
medicine, as they have been reviewed elsewhere. 2 I, nonetheless, must ob-
serve in passing that all these books bear a marked consistency of focus and
clarity in developing research which provides a framework for principled
decision-making in the field. For Smith, that framework-incorporated not
only in his books but in his articles and papers-is grounded in a deceptively
simple yet, upon investigation and application, complex economic balancing
test. This balancing test weighs costs versus benefits in making informed,
critical decisions which consider, for example, undertaking noncoital experi-
mentations to combat fertility 3 or ceasing aggressive therapies for a termi-
nally ill patient.' 4 According to Smith, this economic balancing test, 5 when
applied either to micro- or macro-decisional levels, produces a reasonable
decision that is rooted in love and humaneness.' 6 He states his position as
follows:
Since the binding force of life is love, then it can be argued that
men should endeavor to maximize a response to love in whatever
life situations man finds himself. If an act renders more harm than
good to the individual concerned, and to those around him, the act
would properly be viewed as unloving. The crucial point of under-
standing is that a basic cost/benefit analysis is almost always un-
dertaken-consciously or unconsciously. Of course, the
methodology utilized in this assessment will be situational and in-
capable of absolute determination. Of necessity, the basic norm or
12. Randy Howe, Book Review, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 449 (1990) (review-
ing FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1989)); Josephine Y. King,
Book Review, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 359 (1989) (reviewing THE NEW BIOL-
oGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989)); Barry S. Reed, Book Review, 9 PACE L.
REV. 319 (1989) (reviewing THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
(1989)); Harold A. Buetow, Book Review, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173 (1986)
(reviewing MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECTS FOR IMMORTALITY (1983);
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD (1982); GENETICS,
ETHICS AND THE LAW (1981)).
13. See George P. Smith, II, Assisted Noncoital Reproduction: A Comparative Analysis, 8
B.U. INT'L L.J. 21, 24 (1990).
14. See George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward A Policy of Assisted Ra-
tional Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 282
(1989) (cited in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990)).
15. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (3d ed. 1986) (as-
serting that the efficient allocation of resources to maximize the wealth of society through
economic analysis has been extended to such fields as law and medicine).
16. Smith, supra note 14, at 311.
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standard to be used will be love. 7
I find this construct quite intriguing in its commingling of law and eco-
nomics with love and humaneness. While I can accept the premise of love
and compassion as a determinant in medical decision-making, I initially had
some difficulty in equating this with good economics. But after probing his
writing, I can indeed see and appreciate the relevance and application of the
Smith Theory.
Economics is an inextricable part of modem medical law. 8 Physicians
make seventy-five percent of all decisions regarding health care delivery ex-
penditures and, in fact, become the initial gatekeepers to all medical sys-
tems.' 9 More and more, the inescapable and contemporary challenges of
providing care to patients in decentralized health care systems are seen as
tied to patients' fiscal status or solvency and their medical salvageability or
rehabilitation as a consequence of the treatment provided that, of necessity,
utilizes scarce medical resources.2° In reality, classical principles of triage2
and more current views of cost/benefit analysis dictate the extent to which a
definitive response can be provided regarding the extent to which a sustained
level of health care maintenance can be provided to each citizen.22
The comments of one physician offer an appreciation of the pressures the
average doctor encounters when evaluating whether to admit a seventy-two
year old with severe chest pain:
If I admit this patient, and he must stay more days than the
allotted time for the diagnoses I put down in the chart, who will
pay for the additional days? Will the patient? Will I?
Will I spend my time writing letters to justify to admit and keep
the patient in the hospital until I judge him ready to go home?
17. George P. Smith, II, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63
NEB. L. REV. 709, 734-35 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
18. See George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 443
(1991) (reviewing IAN KENNEDY & ANDREW GRUBB, MEDICAL LAW: TEXT AND MATERI-
ALS (1989)) (critically analyzing the common practice designed to finance health care for unin-
sured Americans).
19. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 23 (1986); see also George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 6
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 437 (1990) (reviewing Dieter Gieson, INTERNATIONAL
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING
FROM MEDICAL COSTS (1988)).
20. George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in
Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 50 (1987); see also Rosemary
Donley, A Brave New World of Health Care, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 44, 47
(1987).
21. See George P. Smith II, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 143, 143 (1985).
22. See Smith, supra note 20, at 50.
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Will I spend, as have my colleagues, days in court before a judge
to argue the decision about whether days in hospital will be paid
for by the third-party payer or by the patient? If I do admit the
patient, will I be able to prove I utilized the time well? And that
means will I be able to explain to a reviewing agency why a day
went by when no test was performed .... Never mind that the
CAT scanner was inoperable that day?
Will I be able to construct a chart cannily enough to convince
the reviewer that I am accurate, efficient and economically
practical?23
In an effort to deal with a national commitment to provide health care
services for all citizens regardless of ability to pay, the United States Con-
gress established the Medicare and Medicaid programs.24 While Americans
do show some concern for providing health *care for all who are in need,25
they are unwilling to pay unlimited additional costs for this service. The
primary concerns of the health care delivery system in the United States are
not only to provide a minimal level of care and equity of access for all citi-
zens, but also to check the staggering escalation of costs associated with
health care delivery.26 The failure of these two goals has sparked re-evalua-
tion and debate over how best to fine tune or totally overhaul the American
health care system.27 Sadly, quick and decisive action is not anticipated.
III.
The role of the scholar is not dissimilar from that of the classroom
teacher, for one role complements and strengthens the other. While the call-
ing card of the scholar is honesty in pursuit of what is not apparent to
others,28 the good teacher also seeks to pursue honesty and truth in the
classroom setting and thereby enlighten his or her students to the strengths
and pitfalls of the legal system through rigorous legal analysis. In George
23. RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, THE CRITICAL CALLING: REFLECTIONS ON MORAL Di-
LEMMAS SINCE VATICAN II 361 (1989).
24. Jessica D. Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the Federal Age
Discrimination Act on the "Hidden" Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 995
(1988).
25. George P. Smith, II, Stop, in the Name of Love!, 19 ANGLO. AM. L. REV. 55, 55
(1990); see also Daniel Callahan, Meeting Needs and Rationing Care, 16 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 261, 261 (1988).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Donald 0. Nutter et al., Restructuring Health Care in the United States, 265
JAMA 2516 (1991) (offering strategies to achieve health care restructuring); Task Force on
Long.term Solutions, Kansas Employer Coalition on Health, A Framework for Reform of the
US Health Care Financing and Provision System, 265 JAMA 2529 (1991) (recommending that
the costs and risks of medical expenses be spread across the widest practical base).
28. Calabresi, Correspondence, supra note 10, at 23.
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Smith's professional life, one sees the strong balance of scholarship and
teaching-especially so in his deft use of the Socratic method.29 The excited
and thorough scholar becomes the exciting and creative teacher. Indeed,
George brings a "generous enthusiasm"3° to his teaching.
As Smith poses questions to his students in the classroom, so too does he
to his readers. Should law, science, and medicine be full partners in the New
Biology,a" or should law be a reactive force32 rather than a directive one 33 in
this regard? Do religion and morality strengthen or challenge and confuse
the tenets of the New Biology?34 Should science be restrained or given un-
fettered opportunities for advancement?35  Should the gene pool be con-
trolled through continued use and experimentation with modem eugenics,
thereby minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social good?
36
What is the extent to which human experimentation in vitro and ex utero
should be either condoned or advanced? 37 Is there a fundamental right to
sexual privacy that allows unrestricted use of any and all fertility techniques
29. Dedication, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1986).
30. Smith, supra note 7, at 36.
31. In recognizing the importance of human rights, Smith emphasizes the need for the
advances of both biotechnology and genetic engineering to be tied to a basic understanding of
and respect for fundamental human rights. George P. Smith, II, The Province and Function of
Law, Science and Medicine: Leeways of Choice, and Patterns of Discourse, 10 U.N.S.W. L.J.
103, 106 (1987) [hereinafter Smith, The Province and Function of Law]; See also George P.
Smith, II, Manipulating The Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697,
698-99 (1976) [hereinafter Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code].
32. See Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, in I ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 211, 211 (George P. Smith, II,
ed., 1982).
33. See George P. Smith, II, The Medicolegal Challenge of Preparing for a Brave, Yet
Somewhat Frightening New World, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 9 (GMT Med. Sys. Div.) (Apr. 1977).
34. George P. Smith, II, Religion, Law and Conscience in a Brave New World, in THEO-
LOGICAL AWARENESS AND TEMPORAL RESPONSIBILITIES 65, 65 (William J. Byron, ed.,
1985); George P. Smith, II, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion, and the New Biology, 3
PACE L. REV. 63, 80-81 (1982); George P. Smith, II, Medicine, Law and Morality: The Szas-
zian Imperative, in I PROCEEDINGS, ASCLEPIUS AT SYRACUSE: THOMAS SZAsz, LIBERTA-
RIAN HUMANIST 65 (Mary Grenander ed., 1981).
35. See George P. Smith, II, Beyond The Land of Oz: Clones, Cyborgs and Chimeras, 2
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS ON MEDICAL LAWS: REPORTS 15, 16 (1982); George P. Smith, II,
Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and the New Biology, 41 THE PHAROS MED. J.
10 (1978) [hereinafter Smith, Uncertainties].
36. See George P. Smith, II, Genetics, Eugenics and Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J.
435, 453 [hereinafter Smith, Genetics, Eugenics]. See also George P. Smith, II, Eugenics and
Family Planning: Exploring the Yin and the Yang, 8 U. TAS. L. REV. 4, 5-6 (1984).
37. See Smith, supra note 13, at 24-25, 45; George P. Smith, II, The Frankenstein Myth
and Contemporary Human Experimentation: Spectre, Legacy, Curse, or Imperative?, 2 BIOLAW
S:463, S:464 (1990); George P. Smith, II, Intimations of Life: Extracorporeality and the Law,
21 GONz. L. REV. 395, 399 (1985-86); George P. Smith, II, Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Em-
bryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 32 (1985-86).
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to create a traditional family?3" More specifically, should restrictions be
placed upon married and unmarried individuals in their use of artificial in-
semination39 or surrogation40 Are the mentally handicapped accorded the
same legal rights of procreation as those without handicaps?4 1 Should lia-
bility be imposed upon women for fetal abuse?4 2 To what extent may the
state, exercising its parens patriae and police powers, control and penalize
unwholesome acts that threaten the moral fiber of society?4 3 Should quality
of life be considered totally apart from the sanctity of creation in medical
decision making, or are both principles part of an inextricable balance that
complements one another?" In what manner and to what extent should
38. See George P. Smith, II, Procreational Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or
Crisis for a Brave New World?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 635, 637 (1986);
George P. Smith, II & Roberto Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L.
REV. 263 (1984).
39. See George P. Smith, II, Sexual Autonomy or Government Intervention: Artificial Fa-
thers and Surrogate Mothers, REPORTS WORLD CONGRESS ON L. MED. 1, 1 (1985); George P.
Smith, II, Artificial Insemination Redivivus." Permutations Within a Penumbra, 2 J. LEGAL
MED. 113, 114 (1981); George P. Smith, II, Great Expectations or Convoluted Realities: Artifi-
cial Insemination in Flux, 3 FAM. L. REV. 37, 37 (1980); George P. Smith, II, A Close Encoun-
ter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J. FAM. L. 41, 42
(1978-79); George P. Smith, II, For Unto Us Child Is Born-Legally, 56 A.B.A. J. 143, 144
(1970); George P. Smith II, Artificial Insemination-No Longer a Quagmire, 3 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1
(1969); George P. Smith, II, Through A Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law,
67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 128 (1968-69) cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973) (Black-
mun, J.)[hereinafter Smith, Through a Test Tube].
40. George P. Smith, II, The Case of Baby M: Love's Labor Lost, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 121, 121 (1988); George P. Smith, II, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial
Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 654-56 (1983).
41. See George P. Smith, II, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally
Handicapped, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71, 73 (1988); George P. Smith, II, Book
Review, 40 THE JURIST 208 (1980) (reviewing J. BOYLE, THE STERILIZATION CONTROVERSY:
A NEW CRISIS FOR THE CATHOLIC HOSPITAL? (1970)); George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 40
THE JURIST 209 (1980) (reviewing S. NICHOLSON, ABORTION AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH (1978). See generally Giovanna M. Cinelli & Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Comment,
Sterilization Technology and Decisionmaking: Rethinking The Incompetent's Rights, 2 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 275 (1986) (advocating the use of sterilization for the mentally
incompetent).
42. See George P. Smith, II, Fetal Abuse: Culpable Behavior by Pregnant Women or Pa-
rental Immunity?, 3 J. L. & HEALTH 223, 234 (1988-89).
43. See George P. Smith, II, Incest and Intrafamilial Child Abuse: Fatal Attractions or
Forced and Dangerous Liaisons?, 29 J. FAM. L. 833, 835 (1990-91); George P. Smith, II,
Nudity, Obscenity and Pornography: The Streetcars Named Lust and Desire, 4 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 155, 162-67 (1988).
44. See George P. Smith, II, Murder, She Wrote or Was It Merely Selective Non-Treat-
ment?, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y (1992); George P. Smith, II, Long Days Journeys
Into Night: The Tragedy of the Handicapped At Risk Infant, in MORAL ISSUES IN MENTAL
RETARDATION 129, 129 (Ronald S. Laura & Adrian F. Ashman eds., 1985); George P. Smith,
II, Defective Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. Sci. & L. 44, 47 (1985);
Smith, supra note 17, at 709; George P. Smith, II, Handicapped Babies and The Law-The
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scarce medical resources be allocated?4" Do ethics committees assist or im-
pede decision making here?" Should scientific and legal frameworks be de-
veloped for accommodating man's wish for immortality through processes
such as cloning and cryonics? 7 Should death with dignity be guaranteed, or
at least acknowledged and protected for both the competent and
incompetent?"8
The answer, or construct for decision making, to each of these questions
follows a basic form. As a situationalist, Smith carefully analyzes the facts
of each problem presented. He evaluates the consequences of particular
courses of action, balancing the economic, social, legal, medical, ethical, and
individual costs against similar societal benefits. Such a course of action pro-
duces the greatest net good for as many people as possible, minimizes human
suffering, and advances economic efficiency when followed and is thus recog-
nized as reasonable, humane and loving.49
United States Position, 1984 INT'L LEGAL PRACTITIONERS 86, 86; George P. Smith, II, The
Plight of the Genetically Handicapped Newborn: A Comparative Analysis, 9 HOLDSWORTH L.
REV. 164, 164 (1984).
45. See Smith, supra note 25, at 55; Smith, supra note 20, at 56-62; Smith, supra note 21,
at 145-48.
46. See George P. Smith, II, The Ethics of Ethics Committees, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 157, 160-61 (1990).
47. See George P. Smith, II, Cryonic Suspension and the Law, 17 OMEGA-J. DEATH &
DYING 1, 6 (1986-87); George P. Smith, II, The Iceperson Cometh: Cryonics and the Law, 1 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH ISSUES 23 (1983); George P. Smith, II, Intimations of Immortality:
Clones, Cryons, and The Law, 6 U.N.S.W. L.J. 119 (1983) [hereinafter Smith, Intimations of
Immortality]; George P. Smith, II, Cryonic Suspension: A Prospect for Immorality, reprinted in
129 CONG. REC. 34,807 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Scheuer).
48. See George P. Smith, II, Re-thinking Euthanasia and Death with Dignity: A Transna-
tional Challenge, 12 ADEL. L. REV. 480, 480-81 (1990); George P. Smith, II, Recognizing
Personshood and the Right to Die with Dignity, J. PALLIATIVE CARE, June 1990, 24, 24-25
[hereinafter Smith, Recognizing Personhood]; Smith, supra note 14, at 282-83; George P.
Smith, II, Life or Death-Who Decides?, 7 PROC. MED. LEGAL Soc'Y N.S.W. AUSTL. 190
(1985).
49. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) (de-
fining the problems of jurisprudence as fundamental, philosophical questions of whether the
law is objective and autonomous or political and personal); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE (3d ed. 1986) (reconciling competing ethical principles to arrive at a moral
theory that judges whether acts and institutions are good or just by whether they maximize the
wealth of society); Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713 (1989) (addressing the principles of natural law and utilitarianism in
light of the historical and institutional foundations of the principles of right and wrong, and
increased societal capacity for formal and empirical problems analysis).
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IV.
There are two main divisions of ethics: normative ethics and metaethics. 50
Normative ethics suggest that efforts be made to evaluate actions and states
of affairs as being right, wrong, good, or bad.51 At one level, metaethics
analyzes the meanings of ethical terms and, at another level, considers the
nature and validity of the various competing theories of normative ethics.5 2
While ethics-as with science-involves careful reflection, application of
complex reasoning processes, and rules of logic, most of the disputes con-
cerning ethics "remain forever unresolvable." 53 Yet, helpful criteria (which
coincidentally are the identical criteria for judging scientific theory) exist to
assist in validating the structures used in ethical analysis and testing the mer-
its of ethical theories: "impartiality, logical coherence and consistency, con-
cern for factual evidence and reasoned analysis, relative simplicity or
parsimony, and consistency with considered moral judgments.",5 4
Normative ethical theories are classified as either teleological or deonto-
logical.55 Teleologists posit there is "one basic or ultimate right-making
characteristic, namely, the comparative value (nonmoral) of what is, proba-
bly will be, or is intended to be brought into being." 56 Those individuals
subscribing to deontological theories seek to promote "the principle of maxi-
mizing the balance of good over evil," 57 and advance those normative ac-
tions designed to produce the "greatest net 'good.' ,,5 Situation ethics
devolve from deonotological theory that holds, in turn, "each person and
situation are unique and must be judged by their special attributes rather
than by broad, generally applicable rules."'5 9
There can be little doubt that George Smith espouses situation ethics in
his philosophical analyses and as such draws heavily upon the works of the
late Dr. Joseph F. Fletcher, III,' of the University of Virginia. Indeed, in
50. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE, JR., CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
ON BIOETHICS AND LAW 73 (1981).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.. at 79.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 80.
56. Id. at 81.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 85.
60. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING REPRODUC-
TIVE ROULETrE (1988); JOSEPH FLETCHER, HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
(1979); JOSEPH FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE (2d ed. 1979); JOSEPH FLETCHER,
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: SITUATION ETHICS AT WORK (1967); JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUA-
TION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY (1966).
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his very first article on law and medicine in the Michigan Law Review, 61
Smith relied heavily upon Dr. Fletcher's work in laying the foundation for
his own theory of analysis. 62 Reliance on Dr. Fletcher's theory results in
Smith's adherence to the principle that human needs, goals, and aspirations
are more controlling elements in medical, ethical, and legal decision making
than any unyielding moral principle. As humanists, Fletcher and Smith are
concerned with the welfare of persons--either on a societal, macro level or
an individual, micro level-being more important than the enshrinement or
validation of a principle or abstraction.
V.
In this 1968 article, specifically dealing with artificial insemination,63 the
opening sentence sets the tone of this theory and those that were to follow:
"The shadowy predictions of Huxley and Orwell can no longer be dismissed
as blurred and unrealistic prophecies."'" Indeed, the predominant focus of
Smith's writings in the field seeks to probe the extent to which law, science,
and medicine are able to form a partnership 65 in tackling the challenges il-
lustrated in 198466 and in Brave New World 67 -a world that, to a very large
degree, is already here.
It is also within this landmark article that Smith shows his interest in the
science of eugenics as a model for improving the quality of the human gene
pool and, thereby, combatting genetic diseases before they manifest them-
selves at birth.6 ' Heavily influenced by the late Nobel Laureate Professor
Herman J. Muller of Indiana University, Smith begins his odyssey into the
fascinating interplay of eugenics, genetics, and the law as they combine
forces to meet the dilemmas of the New Biology.69 He fully explores and
develops this interplay in a subsequent article in the Georgetown Law Jour-
61. Smith, Through A Test Tube, supra note 39.
62. Id. at 129 nn.14, 15 & 17, 130 nn.21-22, 131 n.26, 132 n.31, 145 n.94.
63. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
64. Smith, Through a Test Tube, supra note 39, at 127.
65. Id. at 149.
66. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Oxford Univ. Press 1984) (1949).
67. ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
68. See Smith, Through a Test Tube, supra note 39, at 145-48.
69. See, e.g., GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECH-
NOLOGY (1989); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A
BRAVE NEW WORLD (1982); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW
(1981); George P. Smith, II, Biotechnology and the Law: Social Responsibility or Freedom of
Scientific Inquiry?, 39 MERCER L. REV. 437 (1988); George P. Smith, Genetics, Eugenics,
supra note 36; Smith, Uncertainties, supra note 35; Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code,
supra note 31.
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na170 where he acknowledges genetic manipulation as more a "hope for the
future generations" than a "cure for the present,"'" or a hope for a higher
standard of qualitative living.7 2 It is within this article that Smith initiates
his dialogue on bioethics-the interaction of science and ethics as constructs
for legal decision making.7 3
Stated simply, bioethics investigates the manner in which life can be lived
and adjusted to in light of startling new reproductive technologies.74 It
should be viewed as a natural response to not only sociopolitical, religious,
legal, and medical dilemmas,7 5 but also increased knowledge, from which
arises the ultimate ethical issues of the extent to which new life may be cre-
ated and man remade.7 6
Smith urges continued biomedical research to explore the extent to which
man's biological knowledge can further the social good, evidenced by the
minimization of suffering and the advancement of economic utility. He cau-
tions that "[M]an cannot learn by merely thinking in this area,"' 77 but must
act with "rational purpose and design",78 and "a spirit of humanism ' ' 79 in
meeting the challenges and opportunities of the New Biology. In order to
ensure rationality and purpose, Smith urges public debate over the social and
legal consequences of experimentation. 0 He insists that a balance be struck
between an individual's need to master an understanding of the genetic
code"' to control the future genetic make-up of the human body and the
maximization of the social good which derives from the continued advance-
ment of biomedical research.82
Even though science is incapable of solving normative problems, its use
and development serve a vital purpose in both assisting and evaluating the
70. George P. Smith, II, Manipulating the Genetic Code, supra note 31.
71. Id. at 726.
72. Id. at 733.
73. Id. at 726 passim.
74. See, e.g., John D. Arras, Nancy Rhoden: Exploring the Dark Side of Biomedical Tech-
nology, 68 N.C. L. REV. 835 (1990) (examining the contributions of Nancy Rhoden in the field
of biomedical ethics, including her position on imperiled newborns, abortion, and forced caesa-
rean sections).
75. See K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS at 54, 62
(Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 3d ed. 1989).
76. Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code, supra note 31, at 730.
77. Id. at 732.
78. Id. at 727.
79. Id. at 700.
80. Id. at 727.
81. See, e.g., GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECH-
NOLOGY (1989) (discussing the Genome Project, which is designed to decipher all the genes in
the human body).
82. See Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code, supra note 31, at 700.
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means used in reaching various societal goals.8 3  According to Smith, re-
straints on scientific inquiry should be imposed only when actions are unrea-
sonable or the long- and short-term costs of the effects of a particular process
outweigh the long-term benefits derived from its study, implementation, and
use.84 Professor Smith thus mandates continued research into new repro-
ductive technologies (e.g., in vitro fertilization and experimentation) as not
only a positive means to deal with-and therefore aid in resolving-the trag-
edy of infertility in family planning, but also as a way to enhance the genetic
health of the nation's citizens by engineering man's genetic weaknesses out
of the direct line of inheritable traits.8 5 If, as a consequence of these actions,
healthier and more genetically sound individuals are born, they in turn have
a much better opportunity to pursue and actually achieve a "good life" and
thereby make a significant contribution to the greater well being of society.
8 6
The obvious difficulty in safeguarding human rights, automony, self-deter-
mination, and a basic sense of freedom as inalienable rights is that they must
be inevitably balanced against scientific actions which have the capacity to
improve the quality of life (and thus may be recognized as being a matter of
choice), minimize human suffering, and maximize the greatest social good
for the greatest number of citizens."7 Consequently, social utilitarianism be-
comes not only the goal of free scientific inquiry but also the result of neces-
sary compromises to personal autonomy, societal constraints, and
theological understanding."8 Surely, if truth and knowledge are recognized
as the basic interstices to any balancing tests that must be undertaken, such
compromises must always be acknowledged as reasonable."9 Persistent in-
quiry must be made into what is a "good life" or "significant contribution"
and Professor Smith is open to consideration of other disciplines, especially
religious faith and traditional magisterium. Difficulty arises when only one
perspective is allowed.
VI.
In the 1984 foundational article in the Nebraska Law Review 9° on the
83. George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 25 J. FAM. L. 773, 787 (1986-87) (reviewing JOHN
H. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM IN THE COURT-
ROOM OF THE FUTURE (1985)).
84. Smith, The Province and Function of Law, supra note 31, at 124.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Reed, supra note 12, at 321; see also Smith, Intimations of Immortality, supra note 47,
at 132.
88. Reed, supra note 12, at 321.
89. See Smith, The Province and Function of Law, supra note 31, at 123.
90. Smith, supra note 17.
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rights of handicapped newborns, Smith delineates his theory of reasonable-
ness and demonstrates its fact-sensitive application to treatment decisions of
not only at risk infants but also medical patients of any age. He states, "The
standard of reasonableness is always flexible and responsive to individual
factual applications. This flexibility may be enhanced through interpretation
and application of social policies emerging from each particular situation.
Forces of reasonableness and social policy are balanced as justice or equity is
sought in individual cases."'"
Equally as important as the determinative question of when human life
begins is the value to be placed on that life. Smith recognizes that every
person has a value of incalculable worth.92 He suggests, however, that there
are "situations in which continued physical existence offers no benefits."
9 3
In such cases, maintaining life may be regarded as an assault on the very
dignity of human existence." Therefore, "when therapies would be futile,
and thus run counter to the best interests of a patient, they should not be
undertaken regardless of the age of the patient. Efficacious treatment is no
treatment at all." 95
Consistent with contemporary medical and scientific directions 96 and en-
lightened legal thinking,97 Professor Smith, in agreement with the late Dr.
Fletcher, stresses cerebration as the key factor in establishing and maintain-
ing personhood.9' In fact, he quotes Dr. Fletcher: "In the absence of the
synthesizing function of the cerebral cortex, the person is non-existent. Such
individuals are objects not subjects."99 Without cerebration, -the potential
for sustaining human relationships is absent; for Smith, the absence of this
"relational-potential" is crucial in pursuing the central goal in life-namely,
91. Id. at 730.
92. Id. at 735.
93. Id. at 735-36.
94. Id. at 736.
95. Smith, supra note 14, at 311 (footnotes omitted).
96. See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL
PROGRESS (1990) (suggesting that the patient's condition and long-term prognosis should de-
termine what technology will do for the overall life and welfare of the patient and not what it
will do to forestall death or sustain organ systems).
97. See, e.g, UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12 U.L.A. 338 (Supp. 1991) (super-
seding UNIF. BRAIN DEATH AT, 12 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1991); UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMI-
NALLY ILL AT, 9B U.L.A. 506 (West Supp. 1987). See generally David R. Smith, Legal
Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1986) (examining the law's ap-
proach to death by inquiring into the legal issues raised by cardiopulmonary, whole brain, and
neocortical definitions of death).
98. See Smith, supra note 17, at 737.
99. Id. (quoting Joseph Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood A Tentative Profile of Man,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1).
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to "grow in love of God and neighbor."'' Thus, when one's condition is
such that "it represents a negation of any 'truly human' qualities or 'rela-
tional-potential,' then the best form of treatment should be no treatment at
all."" ° ' In sum, "life should not be viewed as an end in and of itself, but
rather as something that should be preserved so that other values can be
fulfilled."' 10 2
While admitting the principle of relational-potential is not mathematically
precise,'0 3 Professor Smith suggests an ethical-legal-medical framework for
principled decision making. "° This framework emerges when model legisla-
tive enactments,'0 5 buttressed by established technical-medical criteria for
determining futile cases,'1 6 are placed within the balancing test construct of
reasonableness which Smith advances.'0 7 I agree with his conclusion about
the emergence of the framework, but would personally adhere to a unified or
teological approach rather than the situational or fact sensitive one advo-
cated by the Professor.
In his amicus curiae brief to the United States Supreme Court in Bowen v.
American Hospital Ass'n,"'0 Professor Smith argued convincingly that fed-
eral regulation of hospital care for handicapped newborns was an unneces-
sary intrusion into state autonomy and further, that the child abuse laws
already in place in the fifty states were more than adequate safeguards to
protect such at-risk infants.i °" Interestingly, Justice John Paul Stevens,
writing for the majority, accepted this argument."10
Professor Smith's position in his Brief is consistent with his insistence that
the family be the central unit for medical decision making and their deci-
sions regarding medical treatment of their children be guided by what is in a
child's best interest."' He acknowledges state intervention is necessary "in
those cases where the parents are not competent members of society...
[and] are incapable of making mature, reasonable, and loving judgments re-
100. Id. at 732 (citing RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEW WORLD? DILEM-
MAS IN BIOETHICS 349 (1981)).
101. Id. at 733.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 737-38.
105. See, e.g., supra note 97.
106. See, e.g., id. at 724-29.
107. Id. at 730.
108. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
109. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (on
file with The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University of America).
110. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 637-42 (1986).
111. See Brief, supra note 109, at 21-24.
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garding the medical treatment of their newborn."' 12 He presents other ex-
amples where state intervention would be necessary,"' including, where "a
fourteen-year-old, drug dependent, and economically insecure young girl
giv[es] birth to a neonate""' 4 and where parents feel compelled because of
religious beliefs to withhold emergency blood transfusions." 5 In the first
instance, where an underage mother, because of lack of sophistication, mod-
est economic circumstances, and illness, decides to forego recommended
medical treatment on her child who has been determined "salvageable" by
the attending physician, the state would be justified in overturning the enfee-
bled mother's decision not to treat the child." 6 Similarly, when religious
principles form the basis for parental decisions to stop necessary medical
treatment or prevent its initiation, the state is justified in "pierc[ing] the fa-
milial veil of privacy"' ' and implementing the course of action that is in the
at-risk infant's best interests.
I agree with Clark C. Havighurst of Duke University when he acknowl-
edges Smith's recent piece in the University of California Davis Law Re-
view"" as "monumental" and opines that it "should help us, as a society, to
come to grips with our increasing control over our own mortality.'"9 An-
other commentator suggests that this article will "guide" the future discus-
sion on euthanasia and suicide that must occur within society.' 20 In this
tour di force-spanning some 144 pages and 1060 footnotes-Professor
Smith considers whether the theories of suicide, euthanasia, rational suicide,
assisted rational suicide, and beneficient euthanasia will be replaced, categor-
ically and legally, with a principle of enlightened self-determination that,
when applied, allows a humane and dignified death to be recognized. Imple-
mentation of his theory would "render moot the distinction between the
right to decline life-sustaining treatment and the right to commit suicide."' 2 '
Smith advocates that "in whatever context of self-determination the central
issue is cast, a moral and a legal right is nevertheless bestowed upon the
individual to act-for whatever purposes she wishes-to end her life by re-
fusing life-sustaining medical treatment or for whatever enlightened or ra-
112. Id. at 23.
113. See Smith, supra note 14, at 410.
114. Brief, supra note 109, at 23.
115. See id. at 24.
116. Id. at 23-24.
117. See Smith, supra note 17, at 731.
118. See Smith, supra note 14.
119. Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword to 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 270 (1989).
120. T. Todd Tumbleson, Preface to 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 267, 268 (1989). See also
Howe, supra note 12, at 450.
121. See Smith, supra note 14, at 419.
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tional reason she wishes." '122
In reaching this conclusion, Smith presents a restatement of his long-
championed balancing test as the central focus for decision-making. Ac-
cordingly, in determining whether aggressive treatment or palliative care
should be followed in the course of treatment decisions, he balances the costs
to the individual of such a course of action against the societal benefits ac-
cruing from such action. He states, "Determining a patient's best interests
are thus grounded in policies of reasonableness and humaneness. It is an
inhumane and callous argument that protracts the agony of death by using
gastronomy tubes, nasogastric tubes and other means of providing alimenta-
tion under the guise of being efficacious treatment."
' 123
It is not only a waste of scarce economic resources to deploy treatment,
medication, artificial life support mechanisms and other exotic interventions,
hospital bed space, as well as the actual hours of service by multiple health
care providers, but also unloving and inhumane, Smith argues. To attempt
to salvage "unsalvageable" patients who are either terminally ill, inoperable,
brain dead, or suffering from long-term disability conditions such as
Alzheimer's disease or strokes is an inefficient use of scarce medical re-
sources. Quite simply, Smith maintains that it not only prevents those who
are capable of rehabilitation from receiving the total medical services they
need, but also is a useless and unreasonable endeavor. For him, an action is
unreasonable or inefficient when socio-political costs of an individual out-
weigh economic benefits sustained by society-or social utilitarianism. This,
then, is the penultimate exposition of his thesis that he first articulated in
embryonic form in his 1968 Michigan Law Review 124 article and subse-
quently began developing in his writings.1 25 For instance, he observed:
Social justice demands that each individual be given an opportu-
nity to maximize his individual potential. Yet, a point is often
reached where maintenance of an individual is in defiance of all
concepts of basic humanitarianism and social justice. When an in-
dividual's condition is such that it represents a negation of any
"truly human" qualities or relational-potential, then the best form
of treatment should be arguably no treatment at all.
Life should not be viewed as an end in and of itself, but rather as
something that should be perceived so that other values can be ful-
filled. Life should be preserved when it holds a potentiality for
122. Id.
123. See Smith, supra note 14, at 418.
124. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 48; Smith, supra note 20; Smith, supra note 21; Smith,
supra note 17; Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code, supra note 31.
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human relationships.126
In further relating economics with humanism, he opined,
Life-viewed as a human resource-should be developed and pre-
served along those lines which allow for the achievement of its ful-
lest potential for total economic realization, maximization or
productivity. Indeed, human life-at whatever stage of develop-
ment or decline-is both a precious and sacred resource. Its initial
advancement or abrupt curtailment should be guided always by a
spirit of humanism.127
What initially I found somewhat difficult to understand fully as a theory
or construct for decision making, now-upon reflection and analysis-I find
fresh, insightful, and even practical. Its simplicity belies its textual complex-
ity and obvious difficulty in applying it on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless,
as I observe, it is an original theory. Measuring "quality of life" within this
analytical framework does have purpose and modem acceptance. 128 How-
ever, I have difficulty with it and fear especially that quality of life may
become the sole measuring tool for ultimate decision making. There can be
no doubt that one of the last remaining challenges of the age is to humanize
death and thereby no longer allow it to be "a source of dread."'129
VII.
As Diogenes, the Greek Cynic philosopher, lighted a lamp in broad
daylight as he searched for an honest man,1a so too has George Smith
sought to illuminate-and thereby explicate and understand even-handedly,
rather than polemicize-the tenets of the New Biology. In this regard, he is
a scholar's scholar and an outstanding one of his generation, for he is not
closed minded or dogmatic. The great body of his work is a tribute to all
prodigious scholars who join in this great and noble life time undertaking.
As a "prescient prophet of the New Biology,"'' he has done-and contin-
ues pursuing--creative work of the first order that not only provides a
glimpse of law in action, but also serves as an impetus for legal reform. 132
126. Smith, supra note 20, at 62 (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 63 (footnote omitted).
128. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY
179 (1987).
129. Euthanasia: What is the "Good Death"?, THE ECONOMIST, July 20, 1991, at 21, 24.
130. THE NEW CENTURY CLASSICAL HANDBOOK 395 (Catherine B. Avery ed., 1962).
131. Buetow, supra note 12, at 173. A Citation of Merit from the Indiana University Insti-
tute of Advanced Study, presented on July 17, 1985, recognized his "path breaking interdisci-
plinary research and writing on medical and biological issues as they relate to the norms of law
and ethics."
132. Id. at 174. Interestingly, Professor Smith's own commitment to legal reform was seen
early in his career when he served as a consultant for model legislative drafting proposals
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The contributions of George P. Smith, II, in their scale and magnitude,
and the optimism and depth of coverage, are of epic proportions. To use a
word of contemporary parlance, they are-with over 120 total bibliographic
entries-truly awesome! George Smith does more than prophesize the
course of the New Biology; he demonstrates how the law must react to vary-
ing and complex pressures of conflicting interests if it is to direct the course
of the new biotechnology. He has structured a framework for principled
decision making that attacks-if not resolves-many of the present and
forthcoming biomedical dilemmas of the twenty-first century. It is a frame-
work built uniquely on law, science, medicine, economics, and humanism.
In this regard, he has fulfilled admirably the mandate of Guido Calabresi:
namely to shed light into dark places. 133
concerning artificial insemination (donor) for both the New York Assembly in 1969 and the
Pennsylvania State Legislature, in 1976. Thereafter, he served as a consultant and affiliate on
numerous occasions, specifically involving physical and human environmental sciences. Two
noteworthy affiliations include: a Special Consulting Counsel to the U.S. House of Representa-
tive's Committee on Science and Technology from 1981-87 and as a Consultant to the New
South Wales Australia Law Reform Commission from 1982-88.
133. Calabresi, Correspondence, supra note 10, at 23.
